Despite recent volatility and constraints in secondary market funding, analysts have ascribed substantial value creation to the securitization of commercial mortgages. Such value creation likely emanates from enhancements to originator liquidity, tranching of claims on cashflows, gains from specialization in origination, servicing, and holding of mortgages, regulatory arbitrage, and the like. Indeed, such value creation would be consistent with past accelerated growth in the mortgage-and asset-based securities markets and the substantial profits earned by secondary market intermediaries.
Value Creation through Securitization:
Evidence from the CMBS Market
Introduction
Securitization is the process in which financial intermediaries pool assets and resell the asset pool as a collection of new securities. Significant portions of prime and subprime residential mortgages, auto loans, student loans and credit cards have been securitized and mortgage-and asset-backed securities have been issued and sold to the capital markets.
Despite recent constraints on secondary market funding and liquidity, securitization appears to have created value in financial markets. Such value creation would be consistent with the accelerated growth of the mortgage-and asset-backed securities markets and the sizable profits of secondary-market intermediaries.
1 In fact, a number of academic studies have sought to deepen our understanding of that value creation process. For example, a liquidity hypothesis suggests that securitization enhances the liquidity of asset-backed debt markets via a pooling and pass-through mechanism that transforms illiquid financial claims into tradable ones. Further, tranching of asset-backed securities creates senior securities that are less sensitive to issuers' private information. The liquidity premium associated with these senior securities may 1 Recent crises in the subprime mortgage market and CDO market have drawn critics to assert that the financial innovation associated with securitization weakened systemic management of lending risk and in so doing contributed to recent crises in those markets. For example, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke testified before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, on September 20, 2007 and suggested that "The originate-to-distribute model seems to have contributed to the loosening of underwriting standards in 2005 and 2006 ." Others argue that the traditional originate-and-hold mortgage lending kept risk low through long-term borrower-lender relationships, whereas the securitization model encouraged moral hazard on the part of loan originators.
reduce the cost of raising capital through tranching below the cost of acquiring the asset pool (Greenbaum 1986 , DeMarzo and Duffie 1998 and DeMarzo 2003 2 . A specialization hypothesis argues that securitization facilitates separation of loan origination, servicing, and bond administration and thus capitalizes on specialization in each step of intermediation (Greenbaum 1986 and Hess and Smith 1988) . According to a hypothesis of regulatory arbitrage, securitization allows banks to remove financial assets from their balance sheet and thus reduce deposit insurance fees and other costs of holding debt (Greenbaum and Thakor 1987) . 3 Finally, an information asymmetry hypothesis
states that because security issuers may possess private asymmetric information regarding asset returns, they can engage in price discrimination via tranching to maximize profits (Oldfield 2000) or use such pooling and tranching to diversify risk (DeMarzo 2005) .
In this paper, we seek to empirically estimate the magnitude of value creation associated with commercial mortgage securitization. We estimate that value by comparing, all things equal, the interest rate differential between portfolio loans and conduit loans held in commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) structures. Unlike commercial loans originated and held in lender portfolios, conduit loans are originated for the sole purpose of sale into the commercial mortgage-backed securities market.
These loans, often originated by investment banks, typically are pooled and passed through to CMBS issuers shortly after origination. The rationale of our approach is as follows: if securitization creates value as suggested by the above hypotheses, it should be evidenced in the relative pricing of loans sold into CMBS pools. Given the lower cost of 2 The existing studies are all from the theoretical perspective. We are not aware of any empirical study that provides evidence supporting the liquidity theory, although it is deemed as common wisdom. 3 Recent empirical study by Ambrose, LaCour-Little and Sanders (2005) on mortgage securitization provides evidence supporting the regulatory arbitrage theory.
capital, originators of conduit loans can price more aggressively in the primary market, resulting in a rate reduction on commercial loans. However, those efficiencies and related pricing benefits associated with secondary market loan sales and securitization would not be available to portfolio lenders. Accordingly, all things equal, the commercial mortgage-treasury rate spread differential between portfolio loans and conduit loans should reflect the value enhancement of securitization.
In the empirical analysis to follow, we estimate a reduced-form model of commercial mortgage-treasury interest rate spreads, in which the rate differential between commercial mortgages and comparable-maturity treasury securities is taken to be a function of loan characteristics, capital market conditions, and conduit loan status. As suggested above, conduit loan status is the focus variable that captures the spread differential between conduit and portfolio loans, and thus the value created through secondary market sales and securitization. An array of variables representing loan characteristics and capital market conditions serve to control for loan prepayment and default risk, market-specific volatility and risk, regional and lender effects, and the liquidity premium.
Our sample design limits the analysis to multifamily mortgages underlying private-label CMBS deals. Private-label CMBS pools require relatively standard loan underwriting requirements, which reduces the possibility that unusual products bias our estimates. Further, multifamily loans are less heterogeneous in loan characteristics and credit risk relative to loans of for other property types (e.g., retail, office, or hotel). In the course of our analysis, we consider the possibility that omitted variables may differentially affect the prepayment or default risk of conduit and portfolio multifamily loans. To test that hypothesis, we estimate hazard models of prepayment and default. We further investigate lender-specific effects in the pricing of commercial mortgages, and thus the impact of such effects on our estimate of value creation through securitization.
We do so by adding originator controls and by looking at loans originated by a single originator -Bank of America. Finally, we explore potential endogeneity in our empirical model. In that regard, commercial mortgage loan terms and mortgage rates are usually simultaneously determined as a result of negotiation between the borrower and the lender, e.g. a low leverage properties may have low default risk and thus can obtain a low credit spread, while the lender may offset high leverage by charging a high spread or alternatively requires both low leverage and a high spread if the perceived credit risk is high. We address these endogeneity concerns using a simultaneous equations approach.
4
Results of our basic model indicate that securitization leads to an 11 basis point reduction in the pricing of multifamily commercial mortgages, all things equal. Results of estimation of the default and prepayment hazard models enable us to reject the hypothesis that systematic differences in residual prepayment and default risks contribute to the estimated interest rate discount. Inclusion of originator dummies serves to boost the mortgage rate reduction associated with securitization to 16 bps--an equivalent estimate is obtained for the model using only data from the Bank of America. Our simultaneous equations analysis indicates significant simultaneity in the determination of mortgagetreasury rate spreads and LTV. Origination LTV has a negative impact on rate spread possibly because a high LTV loan is associated with a high credit quality property, which accordingly requires less spread. On the other hand, mortgage-treasury rate spread has a 4 We estimate a simultaneous equation model in which mortgage spread is a function of loan terms such as LTV and maturity while LTV is a function of mortgage spread and market prevailing LTV.
positive coefficient in the LTV equation, meaning that the lender may trade off leverage and spread. The simultaneous equations estimate of conduit securitization effects is 20 bps. It is worth noting that our estimates provide a lower bound on value creation via securitization. This is because CMBS issuers, servicers, mortgage loan originators, and other parties participating in the securitization process may retain a portion of the gains from securitization, such that the commercial mortgage rate reflects only the residual benefits from securitization as passed through to borrowers in the primary market. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section provides theoretical arguments for value creation via securitization; Section 3 briefly reviews the development of commercial mortgage securitization and the rise of conduit lending, which serves as a background for our empirical study. Section 4 presents our empirical models and Section 5 reports data and results. Conclusions are drawn in the final section. the subordinated tranche acts as a buffer to the senior tranche in that it absorbs all collateral defaults until the principal claim of that class is extinguished. Investors buying senior tranches expect to be well protected from credit losses while those holding subordinated tranches will get higher expected returns. In aggregate, all senior and subordinated tranches issued out of the trust represent a 100% interest in the trust.
Securitization and Value Creation
In the case of perfect capital markets, it would be redundant to pool and tranche assets and then resell that asset pool as a collection of new securities. Securitization, however, may enhance value in the mitigation of market imperfections as commonly arise. Greenbaum (1986), for example, points to the role of securitization in liquidity enhancement. In a traditional lending environment, the whole assets held by the depository financial intermediaries lack liquidity, e.g. they may be usually large in denomination, heterogeneous, and lack the necessary standardization that would make them easier to trade. Securitization accordingly transforms illiquid whole loans into divisible and tradable securities, and in this manner enhances liquidity.
Greenbaum (1986) and Hess and Smith (1988) argue that securitization also creates value by capitalizing on specialization. Portfolio lenders typically undertake the full range of loan origination, underwriting, servicing, holding, and investment functions.
In marked contrast, securitization enables decomposition of these functions and accordingly allows different intermediaries to focus on those specific activities in which they enjoy a comparative advantage. For example, mortgage companies primarily originate loans and specialize in working with borrowers; loan servicing is carried out by several large servicers; and security issuers concentrate on pooling mortgages and creating CMBS structures; whereas securities dealers and brokers specialize in marketing and distributing securities to Wall Street investors. Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) additionally argue that securitization helps to remove financial assets from banks' balance sheets and thus serves to reduce portfolio holding costs including deposit insurance fees and capital requirements. Commercial banks fund their lending with deposits, which require insurance. Further, loans held in their portfolios are subject to capital reserves requirements. Recent work by Ambrose, LaCour-Little and Sanders (2005) on mortgage securitization provides evidence in support of this theory of regulatory arbitrage.
Oldfield (2000) argues that tranching may allow security issuers to further enhance returns via price discrimination. Assuming that the demand functions for various derivative products are imperfectly price elastic, Oldfield (2000) explains that the security issuer seeks private information about investor demand via the security design and sales process, and uses that information to segment the market and price discriminate among different sets of customers. The price discrimination is facilitated by unbundling the pool and selling the different tranches at different prices.
DeMarzo and Duffie (1998) and DeMarzo (2003) build liquidity-based models of tranching. In those models, the security issuer may possess private information regarding security payoff that may cause illiquidity. However, the senior tranches (low risk tranches)
are less sensitive to the issuer's private information, and thus may enjoy greater liquidity than the underlying collateral. A liquidity premium associated with the senior tranches could lower the cost of raising capital via tranching below that of acquiring the asset pool.
DeMarzo (2005) also shows that for an informed intermediary, pure pooling and sales of assets from the pool is inferior to selling assets separately. This is because asset pooling eliminates the intermediary's option regarding how aggressively to market each asset and thus reduces the payoff. This is called the "information destruction effect".
However, there is an offsetting "risk diversification effect" of pooling and tranching -in that the intermediary can create low-risk derivative securities on the asset pool, and such securities are less sensitive to the intermediary's private information and accordingly can be more attractively priced to the investor. When the pool size gets large, gains from risk diversification likely exceed losses from the information destruction, such that on net pooling and tranching achieve higher gains than individual asset sales.
Commercial Mortgage Securitization and the Rise of Conduits
Mortgage securitization became integral to the operations of the residential markets in the 1980s. However, large scale securitization of commercial mortgages did not become commonplace until the 1990s. Prior to that time, commercial mortgage loans were mostly held by commercial banks, thrifts, and life insurance companies. CMBS issuance was a mere $2 billion in 1989. However, the difficulties encountered by thrifts and banks in the late 1980s, in the wake of a severe downturn in real estate markets and related asset disposition efforts by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), expedited the pace of commercial mortgage securitization. Between 1991 and 1995, the RTC put nearly $18 billion of loans collateralized by income-producing properties into securitization.
During those early years of commercial mortgage securitization, commercial mortgages sold into CMBS structures were mostly those originated by thrifts and life insurance companies. Those entities had intended to hold the newly originated loans for investment in their asset portfolios. Subsequent sales of portfolio loans came about for two reasons: one was to liquidate non-performing loans and the other was to remove some portion of performing loans from the originator's balance sheet, so as to replenish the supply of loanable funds. as an important force in the commercial mortgage market. In the conduit model, the originator, usually an investment bank or a mortgage bank, originates a loan without the intention to retain that loan in portfolio. Instead, that loan is sold to a security issuer and ultimately pooled with other like loans into a CMBS structure. The originating entity typically relies on a line of credit from Wall Street to fund the commercial mortgages.
Accordingly, as the name implies, the originating entity simply acts as a "conduit".
According to Mortgage Bankers Association, conduit loans grew from less than 5% of CMBS issuance in 1992 to about 75% of total CMBS issuance in 1998. In recent years, the share of conduit loans in CMBS pools has been even higher.
Estimating the Value of Conduit Loan Securitization
As described above, conduit loans are originated specifically with the intention of sales into CMBS structures in the secondary market. At loan origination, originators know with certainty that these loans will be sold to CMBS issuers. To the extent that securitization creates value, at least part of the gains should flow to the mortgage originators. Given the lower cost of capital, the originators can then price aggressively in the primary market, which results in a reduction in commercial mortgage interest rates.
In contrast, portfolio loans are not intended to go to CMBS structures in the secondary market at the time of origination; rather, they are held by origination institutions for investment. 8 Benefits associated with securitization by definition do not accrue to portfolio lenders. As such, portfolio lenders may experience a higher cost of capital than lenders executing to the CMBS market. Accordingly, all things equal, the commercial mortgage-treasury interest rate differential between portfolio and conduit loans should reflect the value enhancement of securitization. By comparing the rate spreads of conduit and portfolio loans, we can empirical identify securitization effects.
Commercial mortgage-treasury rate spreads are affected by numerous other factors, notably including those associated with loan prepayment and default risks. We need to control for those factors when comparing conduit and portfolio loan spreads.
We estimate the following reduced form model:
Here it R is the coupon rate of the i th multifamily mortgage loan originated at time t, and ft R is the comparable-maturity treasury rate at time t. Accordingly, our dependent variable is the multifamily mortgage-treasury rate spread. i X is a vector representing the mortgage loan contract terms, such as loan-to-value ratio (LTV), loan origination balance, amortization term, maturity term and property location. t Z is a vector of systematic factors representing the debt market environment at the time of origination, such as the corporate bond credit spread, the slope of the Treasury yield curve, interest rate volatility, and commercial real estate market volatility i D is the categorical variable for a conduit loan. All things equal, we expect a significant negative coefficient of i D representing a reduction in mortgage pricing related to the securitization of conduit loans. Regarding the systematic risk factors, we expect the credit spread on corporate bonds to have a positive impact on the pricing of commercial mortgages, reflecting the general credit risk environment and market price of risk. The slope of the yield curve has an anticipated positive impact on the mortgage-treasury spread because a steeper yield curve implies a higher probability of a short rate increase while Merton (1974) has shown that the value of risky debt is a negative function of instantaneous risk free rate. 9 Interest rate volatility and commercial real estate volatility should have positive impacts on the mortgagetreasury spread because they are positively related to default risk.
A potential problem of this simple linear regression model is the endogeneity of mortgage loan terms to credit risk. Commercial mortgage borrowers and lenders usually negotiate mortgage terms. Accordingly, the multifamily mortgage rate spread may be jointly determined with other loan terms such as LTV. For example, since default risk is of significant concern to commercial mortgages, lenders/originators undertake due diligence in assessing the credit quality of both the borrower and the property. When a lender/originator perceives that a property has higher risk than usual, he/she might downward adjust the loan-to-value ratio on the property (Archer et al 2001) . In that case, there is a simultaneity bias in the single equation model described in above.
To address this issue, we also estimate a simultaneous equations model in the following form:
( )
Here i L is the loan LTV. While mortgage rate spread is determined by LTV and other factors, LTV is affected by yield spread and other loan terms such as maturity, amortization, market prevailing LTV and market credit spread. Having controlled for 9 Steeper yield curve also implies higher chance of decline in long term risk free rate, which is positively related to mortgage prepayment risk.
such endogeneity, we infer the impact of securitization on mortgage pricing from the coefficient of our focus variable, the conduit loan dummy i D .
Commercial mortgage underwriting is much less standardized than residential mortgages, and thus the loans originated are very heterogeneous. To facilitate our comparison of conduit and portfolio loans, we implement two strategies in our sample design. First, we include in the analysis only loans underlying private-label CMBS pools.
In that private-label CMBS pools impose relatively uniform underwriting requirements, this reduces the possibility that unusual products may bias our estimates as outliers.
Second, we focus only on loans of a single property type -multifamily loans --since they are less heterogeneous with respect to loan characteristics and credit risk compared to loans of other property types such as retail, office and hotels.
Data and Results

Data
We use loan level data obtained from CMBS.COM for our empirical analysis. For each loan, we have detailed information on origination date, origination balance, origination LTV, coupon rate, maturity, amortization, property location, lender and loan type (conduit, portfolio or other). regions. The regional distributions of conduit and portfolio loans are similar, except that conduit loans tend to be more concentrated in Northeast/Mid-Atlantic and Southern/Atlantic, while portfolio loans are more common on the west coast. The loans are almost evenly distributed across the four seasons.
Two points can be taken from tables 2 and 3. First, there are substantial variations in loan contract characteristics within each of the conduit and portfolio loan groups.
Second, comparing the two groups of loans, the loan characteristics are roughly similar.
We use the corporate credit spread as a systematic factor to control for the credit 
Basic Regression Results
The results of our simple linear regression model (equation 1) are shown in Turning to systematic risk factors, and as would be expected, a higher market credit spread is associated with a higher multifamily mortgage interest rate spread. The slope of the yield curve is shown to have a negative relationship with the multifamily mortgage-treasury spread, contrary to expectations. However, it is consistent with that in previous empirical studies including Rothberg, Nothaft and Gabriel (1989 ), Bradley, Gabriel and Wohar (1995 ), and Todd (2001 . Higher interest rate volatility leads to 11 It is noteworthy that commercial real estate valuation may be "smoothed" as it tends to rely on appraised values. As a result, the LTV may be biased. If this is the case, the appraisal smooth may cause potential inconsistent estimates in our model. Thanks for an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 12 Later we will present that our own estimates show original loan balance has a negative relationship with both default risk and prepayment risk.
higher values of call (prepayment) and put (default) options. Therefore, the positive coefficient of interest rate volatility is consistent with expectations. Finally, multifamily market volatility has a significant negative impact on mortgage rate spread, contrary to our expectations.
There are substantial regional variations. Here our reference group is Western/Southern Pacific (including southern California). Loans on the east coast and in the South generally have higher spreads. For example, loans in New England have a 6 bps higher spread than those in southern California, and loans in Florida and Texas have significantly higher spreads. This may be because of the differences in default risk across regions. The Western/Mountain area has the highest mortgage spreads.
There are also significant seasonal effects. Loans originated in the summer have 7 bps lower spreads than loans originated in the spring, while those originated during fall and winter time have 3 and 4 bps higher spreads, respectively.
Tests for Omitted Variables associated with Prepayment and Default Risk
Commercial mortgage rates vary as a function of prepayment risk and default risk, especially the latter. In the above basic regression model, we use some simple controls to account for the differences in prepayment and default risks of individual loans. A critique of the above model is that there may be bias associated with omitted variables even after inclusion of controls for default and prepayment risks including origination LTV, loan balance, loan terms and property location. Differences in those variables among conduit and portfolio loans may contribute to the observed difference in mortgage spreads between the two groups. In other words, systematic differences in residual prepayment and default risk may affect the estimated portfolio loan premium evidenced in the model. 
Estimation results indicate that the conduit dummy is insignificant in both the default and prepayment models. However, other variables enter the model with anticipated effects. For example, origination loan balance has significant and negative impacts on both prepayment risk and default risk, consistent with the notion that small loans are riskier than large loans. Interest rate volatility is significantly and positively associated with prepayment and default risks, because the put and call option values are positively related to interest rate volatility. In addition, loans in the Western/Southern
Pacific region (the omitted group) are significantly less risky than those in most other regions. The results of hazard model analysis fail to support the hypothesis that the estimated mortgage rate differentials between conduit and portfolio loans are due to residual prepayment or default risk not well-controlled in our basic model.
Tests of Lender Effects
In a fully competitive market, no lender has sufficient market power so as to influence pricing outcomes. In the commercial mortgage market, however, certain "big" lenders may enjoy either pricing advantages or scale economies. Accordingly, it is appropriate to evaluate the null hypothesis of no lender-specific effects on loan pricing.
To do so, we identify the top 10 multifamily mortgage lenders, each of which has over 3% of loan originations in our sample. They include Column Financial, Bank of America, Wachovia, GE Capital, JP Morgan Chase, Merrill Lynch, CITI Corp, GMAC, NCB and Midland (table 7) . We include dummy variables for these lenders in our model. Table 8 shows the results of regressions that control for lender-specific effects.
Many of these lenders do charge lower spreads, e.g. spreads of loans originated by GE Capital are 15 bps lower than the loan population at large, Bank of America has an advantage of 11 bps, and Merrill Lynch loans have 10 bps lower spreads. However, we also see some of these "big" lenders charge higher-than-average spreads; e.g., loan spreads of Column, CITI Corp, and Wachovia are 17, 8, and 7 bps higher, respectively.
Upon controlling for lender effects, the estimated spread differential between conduit and portfolio loans is 16 bps, higher than that shown in our basic results.
We also separately assess loans associated with one specific lender, the Bank of America. Bank of America is a large lender in both the conduit and portfolio loan markets. Table 9 reports regression results. The spread differential between conduit and portfolio loans remains significant at 16 bps. The results for Bank of America are then consistent with those for the other large lenders, as reported above.
Simultaneous Equation Model Results
Finally we estimate a simultaneous equation model (equations 2 and 3), where mortgage loan spread and LTV are simultaneously determined. Estimation results displayed in table 10 demonstrate that controlling the simultaneity is important, and that our simple single-equation model under-estimates the mortgage spread between conduit and portfolio loans. The simultaneous equations estimate is 20 bps, rather than 11 bps derived from our single equation model.
Interestingly, LTV becomes negative in the rate spread equation, which means that if the lender perceives that a property is of high credit quality, he may allow the borrower to borrow more while at the same time charging a lower spread. Or, if the lender perceives that a property has high credit risk, he may require low leverage in addition to a high spread. Other results are generally consistent with previous results. For example, market credit spread and interest rate volatility are positively related to rate spread, while yield slope is negatively related to rate spread.
The LTV equation also shows interesting results. For example, LTV of a specific loan is tied to the prevailing market LTV. Larger loans tend to have a higher LTV, all else equal. In addition, when market credit conditions deteriorate, (i.e. the market credit spread widens), lenders tend to be more conservative by requiring lower LTVs. The relationship between spread and LTV is significant and positive, which means that borrowers can trade off a higher spread with higher leverage.
Conclusions and Discussions
Despite recent constraints on secondary market funding and liquidity, analysts have suggested substantial value creation associated with the securitization of commercial mortgages. Such value creation would derive, among other things, from enhancements to originator liquidity, gains from specialization in origination, servicing, and holding, tranching of pool cash flows so as to target distinct investor classes, regulatory arbitrage, and the like. Indeed, such value creation would be consistent with past accelerated growth in the mortgage-and asset-based securities markets and the substantial profits earned by the intermediaries involved.
In this paper, we seek to empirically measure the magnitude of the value creation via securitization of commercial mortgages. We estimate such value creation by comparing the mortgage-treasury rate spreads of two types of loans in commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) market: conduit and portfolio multifamily loans.
Research findings indicate an 11 bps rate reduction among conduit multifamily loans sold into CMBS structures, all things equal. Further, we run hazard models of mortgage prepayment and default, so as to assess the possibility that the estimated effect of securitization is sensitive to systematic differences in prepayment or default risk between portfolio and conduit loans that are not captured in our basic model specification.
Results of that analysis suggest the robustness of our estimated results to possible omitted default and prepayment controls. Inclusion in the model of additional controls for specific originating institutions yields a slightly higher estimate of the rate reduction associated with securitization. We also estimate a simultaneous equation model to account for the possibility that the commercial mortgage rate spread is jointly determined with other loan underwriting terms such as LTV. Upon controls for simultaneity bias, our estimated securitization effect rises to 20 bps.
It is worth noting that our estimates here provide a lower bound to value creation through securitization. This is because the CMBS issuers, servicers, mortgage loan originators, and other parties participating in the securitization process may retain some of the gains associated with securitization, such that reductions in commercial mortgage rates on conduit loans may reflect only that portion of securitization benefits passed along to borrowers. The corporate spread (market credit spread) is calculated as the BBB corporate bond rate minus the AAA corporate bond rate, and it is marked to the left hand side axis. Figure 2 Yield Slopes during the Study Period Note: The yield slope is calculated as the difference between the 10-year and 1-year treasury constant maturity bond rates, and it is marked to the left hand side axis. NOTE: Standard errors are in parenthesis, ***-p < .001, ** -p < .01, and * -p < .05.
